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                       UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                            DISTRICT OF NEVADA
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          BEFORE THE HONORABLE PEGGY A. LEEN, MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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     ORACLE USA, INC., a Colorado
     corporation; ORACLE AMERICA,
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     INC., a Delaware corporation;
     and ORACLE INTERNATIONAL
                                       : No. 2:10-cv-0106-LRH-PAL
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     CORPORATION, a California
     corporation,
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             Plaintiffs,
8
          vs.
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     RIMINI STREET, INC., a Nevada
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     corporation; and SETH RAVIN, an
     individual,
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             Defendants.
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                       TRANSCRIPT OF MOTION HEARING
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16
                            September 10, 2010
17
18
                             Las Vegas, Nevada
19
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      FTR No. 3B/20100910 @ 9:09 a.m.
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      (Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording,
      transcript produced by mechanical stenography and computer.)
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1	LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, SEPTEMBER 10, 2010, 9:09 A.M.
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3	PROCEEDINGS
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5	COURTROOM ADMINISTRATOR: We are back on record.
6	We are now calling the hearing in the matter of
7	Oracle, USA., Inc., et al., versus Rimini Street, Inc., et
8	al. The case number is 2:10-cv-0106-LRH-PAL.
9	Beginning with plaintiffs' counsel, counsel,
10	let's go ahead and start with our telephonic appearance.
11	Please state your names for the recorded record.
12	MR. MAROULIS: Good morning, Your Honor. James
13	Maroulis of Oracle for plaintiffs.
14	And thank you for permitting me to appear
15	telephonically.
16	MR. HIXSON: Good morning, Your Honor. Tom
17	Hixson with Bingham, also for plaintiffs.
18	And, likewise, thank you for allowing me to
19	appear telephonically.
20	MR. RINGGENBERG: Kiernan Ringgenberg for the
21	plaintiffs.
22	MR. NORTON: Fred Norton for the plaintiffs.
23	MR. POCKER: Your Honor, Richard Pocker, also
24	for the plaintiffs.
25	MR. WEBB: Trent Webb, Shook, Hardy & Bacon, for

the defendants.

MR. RECKERS: Robert Reckers, the same.

THE COURT: Counsel, I have reviewed, although candidly not studied, given the volume of materials that have been submitted since our last status conference, your new motions that pertain to the preservation order and your updated status report in this case.

Let me hear from first counsel for plaintiffs concerning any immediate issues that need to be addressed, other than I need to give you a discovery plan and scheduling order.

I've read your competing proposals, and I'm familiar with what you are each asking for. But let me hear from the plaintiff concerning whether -- what your immediate needs are from the Court, in addition to resolving the issue concerning the preservation order.

MR. RINGGENBERG: Your Honor, in addition to the preservation order and the discovery plan, the only issue before the Court for today, I believe, is the stipulation between the parties, stipulation and order concerning communications with former employees of Oracle who are now employed by Rimini Street. And that would be the only other issue.

I'm prepared to address that right now, or we can defer that for later in the hearing.

obligations do they have to tell us?

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They say they don't have any. They appear to concede in their papers that if there is a disclosure by a former employee of privileged information, that counsel has an obligation to tell us. I don't think anybody could dispute that.

The case law is clear, their obligation goes beyond that. If they come into possession, whether it's deliberate or inadvertent, of unprivileged information, they have to tell us so we can do something about it.

The defendants can't be expected to appreciate the significance once they've -- even assuming they appreciate that it is privileged information or it's confidential information, they can't be expected to understand its significance or what's necessary to protect Oracle's rights once that happens.

Their sole issue of dispute is once they learn that one of their employees has, in fact, disclosed to other defendant employees or agents Oracle's privileged information, Oracle's proprietary information, they have to tell us and tell us in enough detail that we can then say, okay, here's what we need to do to remedy that situation, whatever remedy may be appropriate.

But we need to be in a position where we can assess the harm to Oracle and then we can work with counsel to find out what happens next.

Their position is they will take care of it.

And a situation in which defense counsel and defendants are exclusively charged with protecting Oracle's privilege is simply not tolerable.

THE COURT: Well, give me concretely what it is that you propose.

First of all, they have to recognize that they've received privileged information. And there may be an issue with respect to whether or not they even appreciate that.

So how do you propose to define the issue?

MR. RINGGENBERG: That's fair. And so the way
that we've drafted the stipulation, which is attached to
Exhibit B to the CMC statement, is if they become aware if
there has been a disclosure. So they have to know.

And we're not suggesting they have strict liability obligation. But if they know that this has happened, then they have an obligation to tell us what was disclosed, who disclosed it, the time of the disclosure, and other pertinent details, to the extent that they know them.

Now, it is certainly conceivable that there will be such a disclosure and they won't know. But we're not asking for anything there. All we're asking is to the extent that they know that there has been a breach and to

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the extent that they know who breached, what was breached, and the other pertinent details, they tell us, they tell us in a reasonable amount of time, and then we can take steps with that information. We're not asking them to do anything other than They agree that to the extent that they know that there are such breaches that they -- and they've agreed in the stipulation, they will take steps to remedy the breach. They're willing to assume that much of a burden. The burden they won't take on is to tell us. And they don't offer any justification for that refusal except they don't think they have to. They don't think they have to tell them. But they understand they have an obligation to stop the breach and to do something to remedy it. just don't want us involved. And we need to be involved. THE COURT: Who will be addressing the defendants' position? I will, your Honor. MR. RECKERS: THE COURT: Mr. Reckers. MR. RECKERS: Yes, Your Honor. I think the issue is very straightforward. What we've proposed and what we've and -- our

consistent position has been that we will follow any of the ethical guidelines as propounded in professional code of

responsibility and also the legal authority. We'll follow all of the law. Luckily, this is a hypothetical, because we're not aware of any such breaches.

But what Oracle has proposed as a reporting mechanism, where we give a whole set of information that's not required by the Rules of Professional Conduct --

THE COURT: Well, let me stop you there. And let me see if I understand your position.

If you had a document production and one side received the attorney-client privilege materials, for example, or clearly confidential proprietary materials and so forth, you would have a legal obligation under the rules to determine whether or not those documents had been inadvertently or accidentally produced; correct?

MR. RECKERS: Absolutely.

THE COURT: Why don't you have a similar idea to inquire or to report, in the case of former employees who are now your employees, to the other side? Why isn't it akin to an inadvertent production of privileged materials?

MR. RECKERS: For privilege it likely is. And our starting point is the rules. The rules are obviously written in a deliberate fashion. And they are written such that the attorney-client privilege on our side is also protected. It's very likely that we will learn about -- if we were -- if such a disclosure were to happen and we were

- 11 1 to learn about it, it would come to us through an attorney-2 client communication. So while we certainly have the obligation to --3 to --THE COURT: But you don't get to keep 5 attorney-client privilege information through the 6 7 attorney-client privilege. 8 MR. RECKERS: And that's exactly what the rule 9 savs. The rule says you have to give it back. But what the rule doesn't go on to say is that 10 11 you have to say the time, place, date, you know, the 12 very --13 THE COURT: Could you live with that order if it 14 was not limited to attorney -- if it did not require a 15 disclosure of the attorneys ascertaining, even if -- the 16 information? 17 In other words, if the information has been 18 disclosed to co- -- what they're worried about is who knows 19 their privileged material. 20 MR. RECKERS: Right. So we're happy to make the 21 disclosure that's required by the professional rules. 22
- We're happy to let them know that we have the information 23 if it's tangible, that we can return it, we'll return it. I think that's clearly dicta -- that's not the dispute. 24 25 The dispute is the other reporting obligations, where it

came from.

And where this comes up probably -- you know, we only know of one individual who has privileged information. There may be others, but we know of one. She's very aware of her obligation not to disclose that privileged information to us.

Counsel -- we're aware. I mean, everyone is very aware.

So I think it's not very likely that she's going to come into one of our offices or tell us something.

I think the real risk is if one of former Oracle employees were to disclose arguably proprietary information that they had from their other company and that that came to us, that's a different -- that's a different legal analysis, what we have to do in that case.

We agree that we can't use the information. We also agree that if we have a document that we shouldn't have, we have to give it back.

But the other information to the time, place, date, person, we don't see any authority that we would have to -- that we would have to provide the information that's requested.

And, in particular, we also have the obligation, the competing obligation under the rules of professional responsibility, to maintain the confidence of an

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      attorney-client privilege.
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                So that's the disconnect. It's not really that
                         There are competing rules and principles
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     we don't want to.
      that are in play here. And that's why the rule of
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      disclosure, I would suggest, is so narrowly tailored to --
      simply to return the information and not the broader
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7
      reporting that Oracle is --
                THE COURT: Right. And let me test then --
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      first of all, have you attached your former proposed
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      stipulation as well?
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                MR. RECKERS: Yes, Your Honor. And what we've
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      done is we have one -- we have one draft.
                                                 And there's only
13
      one sentence. And it's submitted with the joint statement.
14
     And it's in bold so either you --
15
                THE COURT:
                            Okay.
                                    That's.
16
                MR. RECKERS: -- accept ours --
17
                THE COURT: -- what I thought is that you were
18
      in agreement with everything except this one issue, and
      you've identified what language you can live with and what
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20
      language you can't.
21
                              And that's right.
                MR. RECKERS:
                                                  And we've
22
      agreed to, you know, the interview process where we've
23
      allowed Oracle's attorneys to sit in on our conversations
24
      that might touch on confidential or arguably privileged
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information.

1	We've agreed to send a notice to our employees
2	addressing these issues.
3	We've agreed, of course, that we can't use the
4	information if we were to
5	THE COURT: All right. Let me then just test
6	because their concern is disclosing, knowing whether or not
7	their information has been disclosed.
8	Employee A comes to you, and your discussions
9	with employee A are covered by the attorney-client
10	privilege because you're trying to learn about your
11	client's position in connection with this litigation.
12	However, during the course of that
13	communication, employee A says, I told employees B, C, and
14	E information that's privileged to the other side in this
15	case.
16	What, if any, disclosure obligations do you
17	claim you have?
18	MR. RECKERS: Other than look at we cite the
19	rules, and they cite the rules, as well, and it appears
20	that verbal communication like that the rules are silent as
21	to what needs to be disclosed to the other side.
22	THE COURT: And that's where your dispute is,
23	isn't it? I mean
24	MR. RECKERS: Well
25	THE COURT: Counsel

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                MR. RECKERS: It -- that --
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                THE COURT: -- do you really -- you're not
      claiming that they have to disclose to you the content of
3
      the communication with an employee of their client who is
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      communicating with them in an attorney-client privilege
      situation, do you?
 6
7
                MR. RINGGENBERG: We would not pretend that they
8
     have to disclose the communication. The privilege does not
 9
     protect facts.
                So in the Court's hypothetical, I told employees
10
11
     B, C, and E, that's not privileged. The communication with
12
      the attorney is privileged. The facts are not. So what
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      they told the lawyer, we have some concern about that.
                But I don't know how we can deal with the
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     privilege problem in a stipulation.
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                THE COURT:
                            Right.
17
                MR. RINGGENBERG: So if the employees come --
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                THE COURT: And that's why I'm trying to find
19
     out the outer markers of your respective positions because
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      I think I appreciate now -- Mr. Reckers, I absolutely
21
      appreciate the observation that attorney-client
22
     communications are protected from disclosures. Facts that
23
     you learn from an employee are not protected from
24
      disclosure.
25
                And if you learn in an attorney-client protected
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      conversation that an employee has disclosed privileged
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      information from the other side, your position is you're
     not required to disclose that to the other side?
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                              That's a privilege. For privilege
                MR. RECKERS:
      I think there is a more -- that the law refunds a broader
 5
      obligation.
                   So if we have privileged information, I think
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7
     we would report the privileged information that we had.
8
      The fact that it -- whatever that would be, again, I think
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      it's --
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                THE COURT: But who is "we," for purposes of
11
      your answer?
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                MR. RECKERS: Counsel for Rimini.
13
                THE COURT: But the issue is whether or not the
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      employee has disclosed to others, other than counsel.
                You know your ethical obligations, and you know
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16
      the repercussions of violating those ethical obligations.
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      However, the essence of the communication and who else has
18
      received privileged information is something that your
      adversary -- or you would want to know, for example, if it
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20
     was occurring --
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                MR. RECKERS: I -- I --
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                THE COURT: -- to you as well.
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                MR. RECKERS: And so let me sort of broaden my
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      statement since I was suggesting perhaps a different
     hypothetical.
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1 Certainly if we learn that there's any 2 disclosure of privileged information, I think it is reflected in the rules, that's really not part of the 3 dispute here, that there would be a disclosure to the other 5 side of -- disclosure to the other side of the improper disclosure of the -- their attorney-client --6 7 THE COURT: And the scope of that improper 8 disclosure? I would think so. 9 MR. RECKERS: I would think 10 so. 11 Again, our position is that we're going to 12 follow -- when this hypothetical overcomes the past, we'll 13 follow our ethical obligations. I think there are special 14 rules, as Your Honor suggests, there are special rules to 15 protect privileged communications. 16 But the proposed stipulation goes beyond that to 17 protect their contractual obligations for proprietary 18 information that they have with their former employees. Wе 19 can -- we have not seen anything in the case law or the 20 code of professional responsibility that would require us 21 to report those types of disclosures, we can't use it, 22 we -- if it's a document we have to give it back. 23 But still it's not our process -- it's not the 24 process of the federal rules to have us report on misdeeds 25 of our employees; in fact, we have a formal process where

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      they can learn from their discovery, if it's otherwise
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      relevant, to the -- for the proprietary information.
      two different --
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                            Right. I think I have a handle on
                THE COURT:
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     your respective positions. I'll take a look at the -- and
      read over the stipulation in detail and enter an order
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7
      resolving the dispute one way or the other. Okay?
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                MR. RINGGENBERG: I'm sorry, Your Honor.
                                                           If I
 9
      could just make one observation --
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                THE COURT:
                            Yes, sir.
                MR. RINGGENBERG: -- in response to the last
11
12
      question.
13
                While Mr. Reckers' communications with his
14
      clients are privileged, the information that one would
15
     normally put on a privilege log, that is I spoke to my
16
      client, general -- very general description of the subject
17
     matter and the time and date as the information is
18
      routinely disclosed, and if so, if there is that much
      information, at the very least we would still be within the
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20
      ambit of what we would want to know and what we would be
21
     entitled to.
                THE COURT: All right. Let's move on to the
22
      issue concerning the request for a preservation order and
23
24
     forensic copy.
25
                And if I understand correctly, what you're
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asking for, forensic copy and a mirror image would be	
synonymous terms, Mr	
MR. RINGGENBERG: Yes, Your Honor. That's	
correct.	
THE COURT: All right. And, Mr. Ringgenberg, if	
you will address your client's position with respect to	
this.	
I've read the moving and responsive papers, the	
dueling going back and forth. You tell me, and your expert	
tells me, it takes a couple hundred dollars, several	
hundred dollars and two hours per computer, and you're	
asking for 30 records custodians.	
The other side says we have potentially 200	
computers that are issued, it would be extremely disruptive	
and will cost \$200,000 and you can have it but you have to	
pay for it.	
MR. RINGGENBERG: That's a precise description	
of the bid and ask, Your Honor.	
Let me make four brief points. I know Your	
Honor is pressed for time.	
The first is that this information is crucial.	
The information on Rimini	
THE COURT: And yet you didn't ask for it until	
two days before the motion was filed. You sent a	
13-page or a 13-page category request for preservation	

1 after the lawsuit was filed, but it didn't include IMs, and 2 it didn't include the server logs that you are now asking for. 3 MR. RINGGENBERG: The -- Your Honor, there's at 5 least three times when we've explained to Rimini their need to preserve relevant information, including --6 7 THE COURT: That --8 MR. RINGGENBERG: -- information subject --9 THE COURT: That --10 MR. RINGGENBERG: -- to this motion. 11 THE COURT: Okay. 12 And if I could please --MR. RINGGENBERG: 13 THE COURT: Sure. 14 MR. RINGGENBERG: -- explain? 15 THE COURT: I'm sorry. 16 MR. RINGGENBERG: The most specific, three days 17 after this case was filed, we sent a letter broadly 18 describing issues and suggested the parties meet and confer 19 about exactly what they should do. 20 Our goal was to reach a stipulation so that 21 Oracle can precisely describe its own preservation duties 22 and everyone can come to agreement, and we can do the same 23 for Rimini Street's. 24 Rimini Street did not care to engage with us on 25 that. And as a result what happened is we didn't know what

1 they were doing until they sat for a 30(b)(6) deposition. 2 But within a month or six weeks of this litigation being filed, Your Honor, we sent them the list 3 of items that described with particularity what we thought 5 they had to preserve. And one was all communications among Rimini Street employees regarding copying and downloading 6 7 of Oracle software. 8 And we believe that clearly encompasses the instant messages that are the subject of our motion. 9 10 THE COURT: It didn't say instant messages, but 11 it means the same thing? 12 MR. RINGGENBERG: Well, it is a communication. 13 And our view, Your Honor, is that Rimini Street knows how 14 its employees communicate. Its own documents demonstrate 15 that this is an important tool that they use for their 16 business. 17 And obviously if the lawyers are speaking with 18 the employees, they're going to ask them what they used to communicate, and they're going to find out. 19 20 And on the basis of all that information, they 21 should have known the instant messages, as well as all 22 their communications, had relevant information and should 23 have been preserved. 24 If the test were that we had to identify, 25 without knowing the details of their systems, every type --

1 every scrap of paper and every type of document they had to 2 preserve, you know, that's not a workable standard because --3 THE COURT: Understandable. But, on the other 5 hand, the -- the cases and the authors that address the electronic discovery issues do say that fragmented 6 7 information and transitory information, or ephemeral 8 information, is treated differently than documentation or 9 electronic data that is stored in the ordinary course of 10 business. 11 MR. RINGGENBERG: That is correct. 12 THE COURT: And they've countered saying we have 13 all of these -- you know, to assure you that they're not 14 deleting things, they don't have a document destruction policy, they don't have a policy in which mailboxes are 15 16 limited to certain amount of data and it automatically gets 17 dumped out and so forth. 18 So what they're suggesting is the cost of what you are requesting outweighs its likely benefit, given 19 20 their preservation policies. 21 MR. RINGGENBERG: And let me explain Correct. 22 why -- why that's not the case, Your Honor, is the evidence 23 that's subject to this motion is evidence that lives on

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None of the preservation measures that are in

individual employee's hard drives.

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any way automatic -- the only preservation measures they've even suggested that apply to that particular data depend entirely on the discretion of the individual employees.

That is to say, individual employees decide, without any guidance, whether documents in the ordinary course are kept or destroyed. Rimini Street says they don't have a document destruction policy. Fair enough. They also don't have a document retention policy; meaning every employee, setting aside the litigation hold, decides what to keep and what to throw away.

And in that situation, Your Honor --

THE COURT: With guidance from the lawyers that say this is what you're obligated to keep.

MR. RINGGENBERG: Well, after the litigation has begun, such direction was provided. But for the year and a half, when Rimini Street was on notice that this litigation was coming, when they were telling the United States

District Court for the District of Nevada that Oracle was planning litigation against them, during that time period no such direction was provided.

As a result, employees in that time period were not told that they were required to keep the information.

I will say there is -- in the fall of '09, they received a third-party subpoena, and we learned in their opposition that they issued some kind of notice in connection with

1 Fair enough. But it's very circumscribed in scope 2 because the subpoena's very circumscribed in scope. We've attached it. The information it requests 3 Rimini Street is documents sufficient to show three specific things. 5 And so certainly with regard to -- other than 6 7 that very narrow litigation hold notice, they've conceded 8 that as to information on employee hard drives there is nothing that they did until this litigation was filed, 9 10 despite being on notice of it for at least 18 months in 11 advance. 12 THE COURT: All right. Have you identified the 13 key custodians? Because they tell me that from the start 14 they have been amenable to some limited forensic freezing 15 or mirror imaging. 16 MR. RINGGENBERG: Well --17 THE COURT: But you didn't respond to that. 18 MR. RINGGENBERG: Well, Your Honor, what they've said is, "We won't do it unless we pay." 19 20 And Oracle does not -- we believe it's not 21 appropriate that Oracle should have to pay for Rimini 22 Street's preservation efforts. 23 Oracle has invested a great deal of time and resources in preserving its own data, preparing 200 -- at 24 25 least approximately 200 forensic images of its own

1 employees' hard drives at significant expense and trouble. 2 And we believed if Rimini Street had taken appropriate preservation measures, when they were on notice of this 3 litigation and after the litigation was filed, forensic images may not have been necessary. 5 But because they delayed, despite being on 6 7 notice of the litigation, and because they have failed to 8 take anything beyond relying on employees' discretion as to the great deal of employees, that's what gives the --9 10 THE COURT: And yet --MR. RINGGENBERG: -- need --11 12 THE COURT: -- you acknowledge that the issue 13 right now is freezing what they have because once you find 14 out, if I order the mirror images, the content of that, 15 then you may not want to look at it all. 16 MR. RINGGENBERG: It's correct. And let me be 17 very clear about this, Your Honor. And let me use instant 18 message --Because that's the biggest -- the 19 THE COURT: 20 cost is not in freezing it as much as it is in reviewing it 21 and producing it or developing a protocol for determining 22 what within the mirror images should be produced. 23 That's correct. MR. RINGGENBERG: And let me 24 use instant messages as a very concrete example of what our 25 concern is and how we think this ought to work.

1 It's conceded that Rimini Street did not direct 2 its employees to archive instant messages until August of 2010. 3 We know the instant messages in this case on the 5 tool that they use are not ephemeral. The -- Mr. Mattal's declaration explains that he reviewed their specific tool 6 7 that they use, which is publicly available, in its -- in 8 its default setting it saves a file on each computer's hard drive preserving instant messages that that employee makes. 9 10 It's just that they're deleted automatically 11 whenever that user logs out. So they exist, and then 12 they're gone. If they'd just taken the time to check a box 13 that said archive these, they're not deleted at the end --14 end of the logoff session, they're preserved. 15 THE COURT: And that was the issue in which your 16 30(b)(6) -- the 30(b)(6) deponent was mistaken during his 17 deposition? 18 MR. RINGGENBERG: No. He testified accurately 19 on this. 20 THE COURT: Okav. 21 MR. RINGGENBERG: He said employees have not 22 been instructed to archive them. And I said, "Well, what about your computer? 23 24 you use IM?" 25 He said, "Every day."

1	And I says, "Is archive enabled in your
2	computer?"
3	And he said, "Absolutely not."
4	And that's when we discovered. And the next day
5	we said, "Look, guys, this is a big problem. We need to
6	preserve this."
7	And that specifically of course, they'd been
8	encompassed in our general notices.
9	So as a result, those files existed and were
10	deleted in the ordinary course every day or at least
11	whenever the employee logged off, up until August 2010.
12	Those files still remain on those employees'
13	hard drives. Now, you can't see them ordinarily, but a
14	skilled technician can pull them off. At least in most
15	instances.
16	But over time, as the hard drive is used, it
17	becomes more and more difficult to obtain them because
18	additional information
19	THE COURT: I understand. Because they get
20	overwritten.
21	MR. RINGGENBERG: That's right. And all we're
22	asking on this motion is to preserve the for the
23	custodians that both parties agree should be subject to
24	producing
25	THE COURT: And have you

1 MR. RINGGENBERG: -- documents in this case --2 THE COURT: -- reached that agreement now? They proposes 30, we proposed 3 MR. RINGGENBERG: 60, and we're negotiating. But that's the bid and ask. And I suspect that we'll come to closure on that in the 5 near future. 6 7 But 60 would be the cap of what we're asking, 8 which substantially drops the cost, obviously. 9 And so if we freeze those images, then later on, if we discover that they contain crucial information that's 10 11 not otherwise available, then we can go and do the 12 analysis necessary to get them. 13 THE COURT: And how do you propose to discover 14 whether they contain crucial information that's not 15 otherwise available without looking at it? 16 MR. RINGGENBERG: Well, because we'll note --17 well, we won't know what's in those files. But what we 18 will note is what else we get from Rimini Street in 19 discovery. And so if there are holes or if we discover 20 21 leaks or if we discover suspicious activity or if we 22 discover just there's entire time periods where information 23 is missing, then we have a very good reason to simply come 24 in and ask for -- that their forensic analysis be prepared 25 on some portion of the information.

1	But, Your Honor, if this information is not	
2	preserved now and in short order, that won't be possible	
3	later.	
4	Now, of course, we could file	
5	THE COURT: So you're doing this as basically	
6	as a double check. Because if you get the discovery from	
7	the other side in this case and you don't have concerns	
8	about the completion the completeness of the data, then	
9	you may never ask for the forensic review or re-creation of	
10	the data that's captured?	
11	MR. RINGGENBERG: Exactly. And that's exactly,	
12	Your Honor, why Oracle created forensic images of 200 of	
13	its own computers is so that	
14	THE COURT: Because you don't intend to do that	
15	yourself either?	
16	MR. RINGGENBERG: I'm sorry?	
17	THE COURT: You don't intend to do that either	
18	for purposes of discovery?	
19	MR. RINGGENBERG: Correct. But if we discover a	
20	mistake, if something if something has gone missing,	
21	then that's there as a backup, and so that will it is	
22	true that we could just wait until the end of the case and	
23	file a sanctions motion, Your Honor.	
24	But we believe it's our duty to bring this to	
25	the Court's attention so that judicial process is more	

likely to be accurate.

And let me make one other point, Your Honor. We have a specific cause to be concerned that employees in this case will conceal illicit activity because we have evidence that they've done it before.

THE COURT: I have read your papers. I know that you're concerned about the instant messaging and so forth.

MR. RINGGENBERG: And that's just one example.

That's what -- the proof we have. Of course it'd go

broader than that. And so that's why we think it's

important.

One more point about the cost, Your Honor, is if the Court were to determine cost shifting is appropriate in some measure, one concern we have is if Oracle's footing the bill but has no control over the process, then the incentives for keeping costs down and not in place. So if -- if the Court --

THE COURT: Yeah, it depends on who you really trust. Does your expert -- can you get it done a lot cheaper than they can?

MR. RINGGENBERG: Our expert identified a means by which this can be done much more efficiently than the bids that they obtained. And I'll tell you exactly how.

Rimini Street's employees are located all over

1 the country. They mostly work remotely. Their bids 2 require the technician to fly to -- you know, from hither and you to prepare forensic images. 3 Our expert explained that especially for 5 individuals who are technically savvy, which, of course, Rimini Street's employees, are software developers and 6 7 technical support folks, you can send them a hard drive in 8 the mail, attach it to the computer. The technician can 9 connect over the Internet, prepare the process overnight so 10 it doesn't interfere with the person's working hours. 11 then all of that can be done without the expense of a plane 12 ticket or hotel room. 13 Half of their expense in their bids is dedicated 14 to plane tickets, hotel rooms, and rental cars --

THE COURT: And --

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MR. RINGGENBERG: That can be avoided.

THE COURT: And if those costs were avoided, you're not going to complain that the employees may have improperly copied the data? Because that's what the counter --

MR. RINGGENBERG: We would not say that it's improper to do it remotely, of course, Your Honor. I don't know what they're going to do, so I can't swear that their process is going to be correct.

But certainly as to that, we would not say it's

- improper to do it remotely. Because we suggested it, Your
 Honor. Absolutely.
- THE COURT: All right. Let me hear the opposing view.
- 5 MR. WEBB: I'll be very brief, Your Honor. I 6 know you're late already.

If this case becomes war of attrition we will lose. There is zero doubt about it. This issue goes not only to the schedule and managing this case closely so it doesn't happen, but this is a concrete example.

If they want this stuff, just pay for it. You can have it. And we've said that repeatedly. This isn't an issue about them preserving, it's an issue about us having to pay for it.

Now, listen, we want to get to the merits on this case. They've said some stuff about our client and about Mr. Ravin. We just want to clear the air and have this case decided on its merits. And all we want is a process and a schedule that allows us to stay a viable company to get to that point so we can fight on the merits.

And so this is a concrete example. And listen -- Judge, I can't predict the future, but I will predict there will be a discovery motion filed by these guys, one or more, I just don't know what (indiscernible), because that is going to be a litigation within a

litigation, just as the process that's already before you is illustrating this is going to become a problem.

And this is why we just ask the Court to tightly control this. Give parties -- give everybody strict rules and make us follow them. Don't let this become the litigation within the litigation. Because, once again, we've already suffered because of this lawsuit and the marked communications going on about this lawsuit.

If we now have to deal with paying \$200,000 to give them something that we don't think they need -- and where does it end? And we have depositions. And we saw what happened in the SAP case with two multi-billion dollar companies with unlimited resources battling each other. We don't have that here.

We're a small company with finite resources.

And they're being stretched already, starving.

So all I ask is that for this issue and the schedule the Court look at this very closely and say we're going to do what is necessary. These guys have already kicked the tires on this TomorrowNow stuff. They're going to trial in November. They know exactly what to look for. I would hope they don't have to reinvent the wheel all over again in this case. Tell us what they want; we'll give it.

We've got (indiscernible) that were around at

least as early as May of 2009. Listen, we knew this was going to be an issue. We knew this was going to be something they teed up. We've done everything we can. We shouldn't have to pay for their -- for something they don't need. Thank you.

THE COURT: The motion is granted to the extent that the plaintiffs may designate the custodian for whom they request mirror images of computers and have mirror images prepared at plaintiffs' cost. Okay.

And so I'll direct the parties to meet and confer to identify those custodians. You're apart between 30 and 60. Identify those. You really need them, you pay for them.

You don't need them and you think they've destroyed something, that's another issue for another day; if you just determine their documents are incomplete, then what consequences should flow from that.

MR. WEBB: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. With respect to the schedule, I'm going to enter a discovery plan and scheduling order. I'm going to limit depositions to 20 depositions of seven hours duration unless for good cause shown. Discovery is inadequate in order for you to complete this case.

I'm going to limit interrogatories in number to

40. You haven't requested a limitation on request for production. None will be imposed.

I'm going to impose a 12-month fact discovery cutoff and a four-month expert discovery cutoff. And I'll enter a written order that establishes those precise deadlines.

So we'll go from there. And then I will enter an order resolving your stipulation concerning the employee contact issue as soon as I've been able to go back and read in more detail your respective positions.

So at this point do either side believe that further status conferences are required? Or do you want to rely upon the ordinary method of resolving disputes, as if they exist, you file a motion, response, brief, et cetera?

Counsel for plaintiffs?

MR. RINGGENBERG: I would suggest that we -although we do not need a status conference in 30 days,
that we be back no later than 75 days from now, not
thinking about where that date falls, so we can inform the
Court about how much progress we're making with the
discovery we have.

I understand the Court's order. I note that the Court has ordered less discovery than even plaintiffs -I'm sorry, than even defendants propose. And so I suspect --

1 THE COURT: I understand. So it requires you to 2 both be as efficient as possible and doesn't foreclose the possibility that I'll give you more. But you're going to 3 have to -- the party requesting more than that is going to 5 have to show good cause for it. MR. RINGGENBERG: And understanding that, I 6 7 suggest that we set a time now because I do anticipate that 8 we will have to come back and discuss with the Court again 9 what further we need. 10 THE COURT: That's fine. 11 Mr. Webb? 12 I tend to think we can get along a MR. WEBB: little better than that. But we're fine with that, Your 13 14 Honor. 15 THE COURT: All right. I'll set a status 16 conference in 75 days on your progress in meeting discovery 17 plan and scheduling order deadlines. 18 And let me tell you, counsel, I'll consider 19 individual tweaks or adjustments. You attempt to schedule 20 a witness you can't get it done for reasons that one or 21 both sides are unavailable, the witness is unavailable, 22 that's one thing. But wholesale extensions of the

So do the absolute best you can to start talking

discovery plan and scheduling order, I'm not inclined to

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allow you.

1	to one other. Litigation does not have to be crushing to
2	both sides. It can be. So there are a lot of reasons why
3	you should try to cooperate on things that are mutually
4	advantageous. But if you can't, that's what I get paid the
5	big bucks to decide.
6	Mr. Miller, would you give me a 75-day status
7	conference, please.
8	COURTROOM ADMINISTRATOR: Yes, Your Honor. As
9	75 days actually falls right on the Thanksgiving holiday,
10	we'll go ahead and set this matter for Tuesday, November
11	the 30th, 2010, at 9:00 a.m., in this courtroom.
12	THE COURT: All right.
13	And then if you will, please, give me a joint
14	status report the Friday before, which tells me where you
15	are, whether there are any impediments, and whether either
16	side is requesting any adjustments to the discovery plan
17	and scheduling order deadlines.
18	Thank you, folks. Good day.
19	MR. WEBB: Thank you, Your Honor.
20	MR. RINGGENBERG: Thank you, Your Honor.
21	(The proceedings concluded at 9:44 a.m.)
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2	I certify that the foregoing is a correct	
3	transcript from the electronic sound recording	
4	of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter.	
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7	Donna Davidson Date	
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